Quality problem
In 2005, an analysis of the New South Wales (NSW) Incident Information Management System, which is part of the state's Patient Safety and Clinical Quality Programme [1] , showed that notwithstanding Rapid Response (RR) Systems, unrecognised patient deterioration remained a problem in NSW hospitals [2] .
This finding was made against a background of NSW Health having led national and international efforts to design and implement systems to respond to deteriorating patients. Professor Ken Hillman and colleagues as early as 1988 pioneered the establishment of the Medical Emergency Team (MET) at Liverpool Hospital, NSW [3] . This initiative had its origins in Hillman's experience of the preventable death of a young woman, Elaine Weighall, at Charing Cross Hospital in 1982 [4] .
The compelling logic of the MET gave rise to a gradual adoption of similar systems in hospitals in Australia and around the world [5] [6] [7] [8] . However, in 2005, the MERIT trial showed inconclusive results: MET did not substantially affect the incidence of cardiac arrest (CA), unplanned ICU admissions or unexpected death [9] .
Despite this setback, an influential review of the MERIT study concluded that it should not be considered negative [10] , and when the Institute for Healthcare Improvement launched the 100 000 lives campaign in the USA, it recommended the deployment of Rapid Response Teams (RRTs) [11] .
The Clinical Excellence Commission (CEC) in NSW investigated the problem further and found that <20% of vital sign observations were graphed, and only 40% of patients had respiratory rate documented, despite it being the most sensitive indicator of patient deterioration. The CEC also found a failure to escalate care, with ineffective handover and communication protocols; and a failure to respond to clinical deterioration secondary to a lack of clarity in roles and responsibilities, and the skills and knowledge to effectively manage deteriorating patients [2] .
More effective solutions were required and the CEC concluded that 'a multifaceted approach and a series of solutions' was needed, and tested a colour-coded observation chart, escalation protocols and communication tools to improve communication between clinicians.
The CEC then published 'Between the Flags Project: The Way Forward' [12] , making recommendations which became the foundation for the design and implementation of the Between the Flags (BTF) Programme. The BTF programme was modelled upon an Australian icon, The Surf Lifesavers who attributed their success to watching carefully and making sure that swimmers remained in the safe zone-BTF [13] .
Then, in November 2008, the momentum for change received a major boost from 'Recommendation 91' of the Garling Commission of Inquiry into Acute Care Services in NSW public hospitals. One trigger for the Inquiry was the death in 2005 of Vanessa Anderson, a 16-year-old girl, whose deterioration went unrecognised in one of the state's major teaching hospitals [14] . Recommendation 91 was based on the CEC's work and required the establishment of a system (BTF) to detect deteriorating patients and ensure 'all NSW Hospitals make patients safe within 12-months'.
Behind this history of clinicians, researchers and administrators driving innovation in health system improvement and clinical practice are the tragic human stories of two young women (Elaine and Vanessa), who died preventable deaths 23 years apart on two different continents.
Initial assessment
The CEC was assigned the task of implementing Recommendation 91 by the end of 2009. The challenge was to design and implement an effective and sustainable system that would meet the expectations of the community and the NSW Government, to keep patients safe in all of the 225 public hospitals across NSW.
The Garling Inquiry had identified a health system characterised by failure to recognise people who were deteriorating while under care. This included the failure to escalate concerns, failure to respond to expressed concerns from frontline staff, absent or incomplete monitoring of vital signs and a staff culture that all too frequently was reflected in the comment 'I don't think I should disturb the consultant' [15] .
The Inquiry also shed light on the prevailing climate in the NSW public health system at the time. Garling likened his finding of a '… breakdown of good working relations between clinicians and management' to the Great Schism of 1054.
At the time, the world was beginning to comprehend the implications of the Global Financial Crisis. In NSW, this meant that no additional resources would be available to implement BTF.
In summary, the challenge was to transform the safety of the NSW public health system, in a climate where clinicians and managers were at odds, in a fiscal environment in which there would be no extra resources, by designing and implementing a system that would be sustainable and scalable across a whole health jurisdiction.
Designing a solution
The 'BTF' design challenge was, therefore, to develop a system for intervening even earlier (than the MET) in the process of patient deterioration, with a scalable and sustainable, multi-element system, that would take advantage of existing systems and resources.
The 'Slippery Slope' diagram ( Fig. 1) illustrates the underlying premise and design concept of the BTF system, which is that early recognition and intervention reduces harm to patients, and the earlier this happens before cardiorespiratory arrest the better the outcome.
A number of design principles emerged. Some of these were explicit and articulated early in the BTF design phase and others emerged as the programme progressed. These principles were as follows:
• 'adopt a multivalent strategy'-the programme should be a combination of synergistic interventions that complement each other to contribute to sustainability
• 'embed governance'-integrate governance into existing structures and processes to avoid duplication • 'stage implementation'-the size and complexity of the programme required that it be implemented in stages.
• 'integrate into routine clinical practice'-design the programme to integrate into routine clinical practice so that the foundations are secure and enduring • 'balance improvement approaches'-strike an appropriate balance between rule-based and clinical judgement-based approaches to clinical practice improvement • 'keep it simple'-minimise the additional workload and cognitive burden on staff • 'collaborate for implementation'-build a broadly based coalition of advisers, designers and implementers, including clinicians, health service managers, executives, and lead agencies and other key parties • 'standardise tools'-establish minimum standards or standard tools, as far as possible, for consistency across the system • 'be evidence-based'-the programme and its elements should be based as far as possible on the available evidence • 'be patient-centred'-the programme was designed to meet the needs of deteriorating patients regardless of where they were in the NSW public health system.
The programme design had five elements: • 'Governance'-assigned roles and responsibilities for key individuals and governance bodies at state, health service and facility level.
• 'Standard Calling Criteria'-in a track and trigger system incorporated in standard observation charts.
• 'Clinical Emergency Response Systems (CERS)'-individually designed for each facility to meet minimum standards.
• 'Education'-to equip the workforce to recognise and respond to deteriorating patients.
• 'Evaluation'-to provide overall evidence of the benefits of the programme to individual units, departments and facilities, so that they can manage improvement at the appropriate level.
Implementation
In mid-2009, the CEC appointed a Programme Team (a director and project officer) to lead design and implementation, and continue building the coalition for change that was required. This coalition was led by the BTF Steering Committee, which included representatives from the NSW Department of Health, leading experts and clinicians and health system administrators and managers from across the state, whose task was to advise on translating the high-level five-element strategy into an implementable system, designed for simplicity, effectiveness and sustainability, in the complex and demanding real world of clinical care. Implementation of BTF's five elements commenced in January 2010.
Governance
The BTF Steering Committee and analogous peak advisory committees in each Area Health Service (AHS) became the peak advisory bodies for strategy and implementation, based on a comprehensive 'governance' model developed by the CEC. This was underpinned by a state-wide Policy Directive, defining responsibility for implementation and maintenance of BTF, at all levels of the NSW public health system, and stating the minimum standards that all healthcare organisations must have in place for each element of the system [16] . At the AHS level, the Directors of Clinical Governance were assigned responsibility for overseeing and supporting local implementation.
Standard charts, calling criteria and escalation
Standard observation charts (Fig. 2) incorporating standard calling criteria were mandated by the NSW Policy for adult, paediatric and maternity services as well as for emergency departments. Human factor principles were integrated into the design of all charts, which have a 'track and trigger' system so that vital sign observations are graphed and 'tracked' over time. The charts include two coloured zones (yellow and red) representing early and late warning signs for deterioration, respectively [17, 18] , which help clinicians recognise when the threshold has been reached to 'trigger' a system response. Any breach of a threshold (single-trigger) requires an appropriate prescribed action (which is defined on the observation chart). Discretion or judgement (enhanced by specific education-see below) is allowed in the Yellow Zone where the nurse in charge must be consulted (to reduce false positives and guide clinical decision making). No such discretion is allowed in the Red Zone, for late warning signs of deterioration.
Clinical emergency response systems
A 'CERS' was implemented in each facility to provide a response to early and late warning signs of deterioration. The system comprises two levels, 'Clinical Review' for Yellow Zone criteria and 'RR' for Red Zone criteria. Introduction of the Clinical Review formalised an assessment and response (where appropriate) by the home treating team and was an extension of the logic of early intervention that underpinned MET. The CERS was customised for each facility, to suit local circumstances and resources, and included the Ambulance 'CERS Assist' initiative in rural sites [19] .
Education
'Education programmes and materials' aimed at improving skills in recognition and response to deteriorating patients were developed. Three tiers of education were defined.
• Tier 1-awareness of the BTF system, compulsory for all staff.
• Tier 2-skills training in recognition and early treatment of deterioration, Detecting Deterioration Evaluation Treatment, Figure 1 The 'Slippery Slope'.
Escalation and Communication in Teams (DETECT) was delivered progressively to all clinical staff.
• Tier 3-specific training, including advanced life support, for all staff that are required to provide a formal RR to a patient with observations in the Red Zone.
Evaluation
As defined in the NSW Policy, all hospitals collect and report two key performance indicators (KPIs) to the NSW Ministry of Health, with this information being used to continuously improve the system.
Staging
In January 2010, the Standard Adult General Observation (SAGO) charts were implemented in all NSW hospitals, and the awareness education package was mandated for all staff. CERS were also implemented from this date in all hospitals. Subsequently, Tier 2 education was provided to all clinical staff involved in patient care, taking over 3 years to complete. This education is ongoing and 64 000 staff have been trained. The standard observation charts for other patient groups were implemented progressively, as the implementers had capacity to do so.
Evaluation
Outcome data and statistical analysis Since August 2010, two KPIs with standard definitions have been collected and reported monthly to the NSW DoH and the CEC, by all health services, with 100% compliance:
• the RR call rate, per 1000 separations ('Process' measure) • CA rate, per 1000 separations, among hospitalised ward patients (excluding ICU) over 18 years old without a documented 'not for resuscitation' (NFR) order ('Outcome' measure).
These KPIs were compared over time using crude percentage and prevalence ratios. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals were calculated comparing the baseline period (in the first year of implementation) and subsequent time periods after implementation [20] . Correlation between 6 monthly rates of RR calls and CA were measured using Pearson's correlation coefficient. All statistical analyses were performed using IBM SPSS Statistics, version 19 (Chicago, IL).
Results Table 1 and Fig. 3 show that the crude RR call rate increased from 18 per 1000 acute separations at baseline (August-December 2010) to 43 per 1000 in January-June 2015 (136% increase). The prevalence ratio, which measures the prevalence of RR calls at a specific time compared to baseline, confirms the significant increase (P < 0.05) observed in the recent period (January-June 2015) as 2.4 times higher compared with the baseline (August-December 2010). The CA rate decreased over time, as evidenced by a significant 42% decrease in the January-June 2015 period compared with the baseline. This result was consistent with the significant decreased prevalence ratio observed in the same period (January-June 2015), 0.6 compared with the baseline. The correlation between the increase in RR calls and the inverse decrease in CA rates was statistically significant (Pearson correlation coefficient −0.715, P = 0.02). 
Staff survey
Surveys were conducted on the effectiveness of BTF each year from 2010 to 2012 using the established Quality Systems Assessment (QSA) [21] . The QSA self-assessment survey is undertaken by over 1500 respondents from across the NSW Health system with a 96% response rate. The survey shows that staff strongly support the programme and believe it is improving patient safety. The strength of this support has grown over time with the proportion of respondents strongly agreeing that BTF has benefitted patient safety more than doubling from 21% to 44%, and overall agreement rising from 68% to 82% (Fig. 4) . Staff comments in the QSA indicate support for the programme and the significant contribution it was making to patient safety. For example, one senior nurse completing the QSA wrote: 'BTF has given nurses the confidence to call Clinical Reviews. This simple change … has been one of the best changes in 20 years to ensure patient safety' [22] .
Hospital visits
Visits to NSW facilities demonstrate effective implementation of the key elements of the programme and confirm strong support for the programme. Key themes arising from these visits and interviews with staff suggest that (i) BTF has empowered clinicians to escalate care for their patients by clearly defining and improving recognition of the patient who is clinically deteriorating and (ii) the programme is now part of normal clinical practice, with BTF becoming part of everyday language and culture among clinicians. For example, it is commonplace for staff to describe patients who have observations within normal limits (i.e. not meeting criteria for Yellow or Red Zones on the SAGO Chart) as being 'BTF'.
External reviews
There have been two reviews by independent bodies. The Independent Panel, appointed to review progress with the Garling recommendations, wrote, 'the feedback on BTF has been very encouraging and is a positive reflection on the collaborative approach taken by the DoH and the CEC to engage with clinicians and health services to roll out this programme in an efficient and effective way'; [23] and KPMG wrote in a review of the Patient Safety Programme 'Nearly every consultation group highlighted BTF as being one of the most effective projects associated with the CEC'.
Lessons learned
BTF's multi-element design and scale are unique. In 5 years, the programme has become embedded in routine clinical practice across NSW and is changing the culture of patient safety. The finding of a significant decline in CA rate, accompanied by a significant increase in RR rate in NSW hospitals is consistent with the new system being effective [24] . However, we do not know what impact, if any, BTF has had on the issuing of NFR orders [25, 26] .
Introduction of such a multi-element safety-net system, with its highly recognisable BTF observation charts, which are a core part of everyday clinical practice, promotes a strong patient safety message about standardisation and 'how we do things around here'. The system also provides a foundation for other programmes and systems, for example, the CEC's SEPSIS KILLS programme [27] .
Comprehensive governance structures and processes which provide clarity about who is responsible for what, at all levels of the NSW public health system, are pivotal to successful implementation and long-term sustainability of BTF. In particular, the role of the NSW Directors of Clinical Governance is arguably their signature achievement in the NSW public health system, and has provided a model for future implementations of safety programmes and systems.
The standardisation of the observation charts provided a common foundation for BTF across the health system, which links the universal clinical practice of taking and documenting vital sign observations to locally designed CERS. The general lesson for other improvement initiatives is that systems grounded in an established universal clinical practice are likely to be more sustainable.
Striking the right balance between a rule-based approach (imposed through standard escalation criteria and rules) and individual clinical judgement has also proved to be essential. This balance can have a significant impact on resource use. BTF is explicitly designed to strike this optimal balance, exploiting the safety-net benefits of rules while at the same time enhancing, rather than undermining, individual clinical judgement through education and support for nurses from the nurse in charge.
Experience shows that the system needs time to mature. Instilling confidence in clinicians to use their clinical discretion in the Yellow Zone, supported by education, takes time but in mature systems the discretion appears to work well. So programme implementers should have patience and work explicitly on strategies for reinforcing discretion and judgement by clinicians when patients have early warning signs.
Such safety-net systems are also likely to be supported by nursing, medical and allied health staff, as they are in NSW. These systems provide an opportunity to engage staff in addressing the challenges that can make healthcare systems comparatively unreliable, such as poor communication and a lack of teamwork, and the need for greater clinician engagement. These safety-net systems objectively expose the failure to recognise and respond to deteriorating patients and apply further pressure to resolve problems of unreliability, which must ultimately be resolved by building highreliability patient care teams [28, 29] .
Health systems should consider giving priority to establishing such safety-net systems at scale across jurisdictions.
